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THE AYAHUASCA PATENT REVOCATION: 
RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT CURRENT 
U.S. PATENT POllCY 
LEANNE M. FECTEAU* 
Abstract: This Note explores the discriminatory effect of U.S. patent 
law and policy on indigenous communities in developing countries. For 
years, Western researchers have relied upon local people to point them 
to useful regional plants and animals so that they could then isolate, 
develop and patent the chemical compounds found in the organisms. 
Yet, the U.S. patent system does not recognize or value the traditional 
knowledge of indigenous groups regarding their regional biodiversity. 
Rather, the researchers who isolate the compounds can obtain a patent 
with no recognition for the indigenous knowledge upon which they 
relied. Recently, the World Trade Organization has succeeded at 
globalizing Western intellectual property systems through international 
treaties. These efforts have met with significant resistance in several 
developing countries. The controversy over the ayahuasca patent is one 
example of developing countries' opposition to Western-style 
intellectual property rights. By implementing the suggestions described 
in this Note, the United States could ensure that indigenous knowledge 
would be recognized and thus could avoid future controversies like the 
one surrollilding the ayahuasca patent. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Loren Miller, an American scientist and entrepreneur, 
obtained a U.S. patent on a strain of the ayahuasca vine} Ayahuasca, a 
vine native to the Amazon Rain Forest, has been used by healers and 
religious leaders throughout the Amazon for generations.2 For hun-
dreds of years, shamans have used ayahuasca to treat sicknesses, con-
tact spirits, and foresee the future.3 Many indigenous Amazon tribes 
also view the plant as a sacred symbol of their religion.4 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2000-2001). 
1 See Glenn M. Wiser, PTO Rejection of the "Ayahuasca" Patent Claim: Background and 
Analysis § 2, at http://ciel.org/ptorejection.html (Nov. 1999). 
2Id. § 1. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
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Several years after its issuance, tribal leaders learned of Miller's 
patent.5 They were understandably angry and incredulous that a for-
eigner had patented a plant that they had been using and worshiping 
for hundreds of years.6 Voicing his countrymen's frustration, Antonio 
]acanamijoy, the leader of a council representing more than 400 in-
digenous tribes and groups in South America, stated, "[o]ur ancestors 
learned the knowledge of this medicine and we are the owners of this 
knowledge."7 In 1999,]acanimijoy's council applied for and obtained 
a rejection of the ayahuasca patent from the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office.s The controversy over the patent generated considerable 
hostility between the United States and Ecuador and eventually led 
Ecuador's legislature to forgo signing a bilateral intellectual property 
rights agreement with the United States.9 
The ayahuasca patent and the controversy it evoked is quite typi-
cal of the issues facing the biotechnology industry.1o Today, research-
ers from the United States travel to distant, resource-rich regions of 
the world, such as the Amazon, for the express purpose of gleaning 
scientific knowledge from indigenous populations regarding the var-
5Id. § 2. 
6 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 2; CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAw (CIEL), COMMENTS ON IM-
PROVING IDENTIFICATION OF PRIOR ART: RECOMMENDATIONS ON TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE § IV(D), athttp://ciel.org/bwp.html (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter CIELJ. 
Under the U.S. Patent Act, applicants cannot patent medicinal plants in their natural state. 
See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAw ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 80 (1999). However, if a 
Western researcher separates the plant's chemical compounds in a fashion that is not 
naturally occurring, it becomes eligible for patent protection. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of 
Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and 
Local Communities, 17 MICH.]. INT'L L. 919, 938 (1996). 
7 See Bill Lambrecht, Amazon Tribal Leaders Challenge U.S. Patent: They Say American Has 
No Right to Plant Used in Healing, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Mar. 31, 1999, at AS (quoting 
Antonio Jacanamijoy). 
8 See Wiser, supra note 1, §§ 3, 5. 
9 SeeCIEL, supra note 6, § IV(D). 
10 See, e.g., James O. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 
2]. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 145-49 (1994); Valentina Tejera, Note, Tripping over Praperty 
Rights: Is It Possible to Reconcile the Convention on Biological Diversity with Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement?, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 967, 972 (1999); Craig Benjamin, Biapiracy and Native 
Knowledge: Indigenous Rights on the Last Frontier, NATIVE AMERICAS, June 30, 1997, available at 
1997 WL 15895006; Vandana Shiva, The U.S. Patent System Legalizes Theft and Biapiracy, THE 
HINDU, at http://www.purefood.org/Patent/USpatsys.cfr(July28.1999).InI997. corpo-
rations and government agencies were researching 1000 traditional plants and their uses. 
Benjamin, supra. For instance, in a period of five years the National Cancer Institute col-
lected lO,OOO plant specimens from six countries. Id. Although it is a publicly funded or-
ganization, the Institute obtains patents on discoveries that have potential commercial 
value.Id. 
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ied uses of local plants and animals. ll These researchers are free to 
return to their countries with their plant or animal samples, isolate a 
chemical compound, and subsequently obtain a patent. I2 Protected by 
their patents, the researchers are not bound to share in the profits 
from their patented items with the indigenous tribes from whom they 
gained the critical knowledge.l3 This activity has come to be known as 
"biopiracy. "14 
Biopiracy has been on the rise ever since a 1980 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision held that people could patent biological living organ-
isms.l5 In response, many developing countries have enacted legisla-
tion designed to protect their natural resources, often by drastically 
cutting foreign-researchers' access to some of the most diverse eco-
systems in the world. I6 
Exacerbating the situation, the United States does not recognize 
prior foreign use of an "invention" as a bar to obtaining a patent un-
less such foreign use has been published and is available for all to 
find,l7 In contrast, prior domestic use of an "invention" is enough, 
without publication, to preclude issuance of a patent. IS This differing 
treatment of domestic and foreign use dates back to a time when in-
ventors in this country likely would not have known that an invention 
11 See Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification 
of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 279, 279 (1999); Tejera, supra note 10, at 971; see also 
Lakshmi Sarma, Note, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Form of International 
Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 107, 108 (1999). 
12 See Marden, supra note 11, at 279; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 938. 
!3 See Scott Holwick, Note, Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-&lated Aspects of 
Intellectual PropeTty Rights, 1999 Y.B. COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 49, 57-58 (2000); 
Sarma, supra note 11, at 108; see also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 938. See generally Odek, 
supra note 10, at 145-49 (discussing examples of uncompensated appropriation of plant 
genetic resources). 
14 See David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional 
Knowledge, 25 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 253, 263 (2000); Odek, supra note 10, at 145; Sarma, 
supra note 11, at 117; Tejera, supra note 10, at 971; Shiva, supra note 10; see also Marden, 
supra note 11, at 280. 
15 See Diamond v. Chakrobarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Andrew J. Pollack, Biological 
Products Raise Genetic Ownership Issues: Governments ATe Demanding Share of Profits, N.V. TIMES, 
Nov. 26, 1999, at C4. 
16 See Pollack. supra note 15, at C4. For instance, Brazilian environmentalists sued a 
non-governmental organization alleging that it stole traditional knowledge from indige-
nous peoples. See Mario Osava, Brazil-Biodiversity: Crackdollm on Eca-Pirates, INTER. PRESS 
SERVICE, Aug. 14, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13256081. Since the suit, legislative proposals 
have been put forth in an attempt to protect Brazil's biodiversity by imposing harsh penal-
ties 011 biopirates claiming rights to biological materials taken from the rain forests. See id. 
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
18 See id. 
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that was new in the United States was in fact common knowledge 
elsewhere.19 With modern technological and communications ad-
vances, the foreign use exclusion has come under increased criti-
cism.20 Unlike in previous centuries, the ease of international travel 
and research today makes prior foreign use of an invention accessible 
to U.S. researchers.21 
Since most of the world's remaining biodiversity is concentrated 
in underdeveloped southern countries, such as Brazil and India, in-
creasing protectionism on the part of these developing nations could 
significantly impair research regarding the fight against diseases. 22 
This result is not in anyone's best interest.23 In order to reverse this 
protectionist trend, the United States and other developed nations 
should consider ways to reform domestic patent laws as well as inter-
national patent treaties to reflect more accurately the needs of devel-
oping countries and their indigenous populations. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the current U.S. patent law regard-
ing prior foreign use or knowledge. In particular, Part I will discuss 
how the current U.S. policy discriminates against developing nations 
and their indigenous populations by failing to value traditional 
knowledge. Part II will then illustrate the detrimental effect U.S. pol-
icy has on developing countries by offering a more detailed descrip-
tion of the ayahuasca patent controversy. Finally, Part III will suggest 
ways to reform current U.S. patent policy. In particular, Part III argues 
that the U.S. should: (1) enforce the public policy and morality as-
pects of current patent law so that morally offensive patents are not 
issued; (2) alter its current patent law to recognize prior foreign use 
as a bar to issuance of a patent; and (3) urge reform of the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, so 
that, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Biological 
Diversity, it would seek a more equal distribution of the benefits de-
19 See Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the 
Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 386 (1997) (citing Donald S. Chisum, Foreig;n Activity: 
Its Effect on Patentability under United States Patent Law, 11 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COpy-
RIGHTL. 26, 36 (1980». 
20 See Marden, supra note 11, at 289; see also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 936. See gener-
all:y Kadidal, supra note 19. 
21 See Kadidal, supra note 19, at 397. 
22 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 926-27; Pollack, supra note 15, at AI. A large 
amolffit of the Earth's genetic diversity has already disappeared. See Roht-Arriaza, supra 
note 6, at 926-27. For example, ninety percent of all the vegetable types distributed by 
seed houses in the United States early in the twentieth century are extinct today. Id. In the 
past 100 years, half of Europe's domestic animal species became extinct. Id. 
23 See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 927; Pollack, supra note 15, at AI. 
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rived from biodiversity between developed and developing nations. 
This Note concludes that, by implementing the three measures men-
tioned above, the United States would improve considerably its rela-
tions with resource-rich developing nations. It further concludes that 
these measures would help to ensure that biologically diverse ecosys-
tems and traditional knowledge systems are preserved so that they 
continue to be available in the future as a source for the discovery and 
development of new pharmaceutical and agricultural products. 
1. CURRENT U.S. PATENT LAw AND POLICY 
A. Requirements for Patentability 
In order to receive a patent under U.S. law, an individual must 
demonstrate the (1) novelty; (2) non-obviousness; and (3) utility of 
her invention.24 Although these are useful measures for determining 
whether an inventor deserves an exclusive property right, as presently 
applied, these criteria result in discrimination toward indigenous 
groups in developing nations.25 
l. Novelty 
Federal law requires that, in order to obtain a patent on an in-
vention or discovery, the invention or discovery must be new.26 Sec-
tion 102(a) of the Patent Act provides that a person can obtain a pat-
ent unless "the invention was known or used by others in this country, 
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent. "27 
Thus, an important goal of the U.S. Patent Act is to distinguish 
claimed inventions from prior inventions to ensure that patents are 
only granted for products and processes that are actually new.28 When 
deciding whether or not to issue a patent, patent examiners look to 
24 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994). 
25 See Sarma. supra note 11, at 130; CIEL. supra note 6, § II; see al50 Roht-Arriaza, supra 
note 6, at 93~0. 
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a); DURHAM, supra note 6, at 80. 
27 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) . In addition to § 102(a) 's prior art categories that preclude issu-
ance of a patent, § 102(b) states that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless "the in-
vention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or 
in public use or on sale in this country. more than one year prior to the date of the appli-
cation for patent in the United States .... " [d. § 102(a)-(b). 
28 See DURHAM. supra note 6, at 80. 
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the existence of any prior art references.29 Prior art references in-
clude: prior inventions, patents, patent applications, and publications 
discussing prior inventions.3o The specific types of prior art references 
upon which the Patent and Trademark Office (PTa) relies are listed 
in 35 U.S.C. § 102.31 In particular, § 102(a) identifies four categories 
of prior art references that preclude issuance of a patent: (1) prior 
knowledge of the invention by others in the United States; (2) prior 
use of the invention in the United States; (3) prior patent of the in-
vention in any country; and (4) the printed publication of the inven-
tion in any country.32 
As § 102(a) demonstrates, prior use or knowledge of an inven-
tion in this country is enough to preclude issuance of a patent, while 
the same prior use or knowledge in a foreign country has no effect on 
patentability.33 The reason for this apparent double standard is that, 
historically, U.S. patent laws have based prior art references on acces-
sibility.34 In other words, the use or knowledge of a prior invention, 
must be accessible to the public in this country.35 While foreign publi-
cations or patents meet this criteria, unpublished foreign use or 
knowledge do not.36 This distinction has the effect of discriminating 
against indigenous populations in foreign countries because their 
traditional knowledge is rarely published.37 Furthermore, such a dis-
tinction is not useful in the bio-piracy arena: biopirates who "discover" 
new species of plants and animals are able to pass the novelty re-
quirement, even though indigenous people have often led them to 
the "new" species and imparted to them information about its tradi-
tional use.38 Thus, by granting patents in this type of situation, U.S. 
29 See id. at 80-81. 
30 See id. 
31 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
32Id. 
33 See id.; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 380,385. To prove prior use one must show that 
the prior user had a physical embodiment of the claimed invention, used the invention as 
the current applicant intends, and did not conceal his use of the invention. See id. at 381-
82. Prior knowledge requires that there was a model or written procedure that if reduced 
to practice would have worked in the way that the current applicant intends. Id. at 381. 
34 See DURHAM, supra note 6, at 82. 
35 See id. at 83. 
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
37 See Sarma, supra note 11, at 130; see also Downes, supra note 14, at 277-78. 
38 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 926,928; Sarma, supra note 11, at 116-17. Bio-
prospectors who inquire from indigenous people about useful plants can increase the 
success ratio of their trials for useful substances from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 2. See Roht-Arriaza, 
supra note 6, at 928. 
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patent law seems to violate the very goals that underpin the novelty 
requirement. 39 
2. Non-Obviousness 
In addition to the novelty requirement, § 103 of the Patent Act 
also requires that an invention or discovery be non-obvious in order 
to be patentable.40 The non-obviousness requirement precludes any 
invention that would have been obvious at the time of invention to a 
person with ordinary skill in the particular art. 41 
As under the novelty requirement, the prior art relied upon to 
determine whether an invention is obvious would not cover prior 
knowledge or use in a foreign country.42 As a result, the "person with 
ordinary skill in the particular art" would not include a member of an 
indigenous population in a foreign country.43 Therefore, the non-
obviousness requirement discriminates against indigenous persons in 
the same way as the novelty requirement.44 In addition, this effect on 
indigenous persons is often exacerbated when the invention involves 
chemical compounds because indigenous use of a plant does not re-
quire isolation of the chemical compounds that make up the plant.45 
If prior art references show that a compound likely contains certain 
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a); DURHAM, supra note 6. at 82; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 
921, 926, 928. 
40 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
41 See id. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) reads: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such 
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. 
[d. § 103(a). For a helpful case, see Graham v. John Deere Co., which holds that obviousness 
or non-obviousness of subject matter is to be determined by looking to the scope and con-
tent of prior art, the differences between prior art and claims at issue, and the level of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent art. See 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); see also Roht-Arriaza, supra 
note 6, at 937. An inventor who simply examines prior knowledge and follows the next 
logical step to solve a problem, has not met the nonobviousness requirement of the Patent 
Act. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17; see also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 937. 
42 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103. 
43 See id.; Sarma, supra note 11, at 130. 
44 See Sarma, supra note 11, at 129-30. 
45 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 937. 
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qualities, patent applicants must rebut the presumption of obvious-
ness.46 
A common method of rebutting the presumption is to show that 
the new compound displays "unexpectedly improved properties. "47 
Because plants are made up of biochemical compounds, the isolation 
of these compounds must prove that the new genetic configuration 
displays "unexpected properties. "48 Therefore, it is nearly impossible 
for indigenous groups to obtain patents on their own innovations be-
cause their unprocessed uses of medicinal plants would be considered 
obvious.49 Furthermore, indigenous communities have no means and 
no need to improve the chemical compounds of plants in order to 
meet the non-obviousness requirement. 50 Unlike Western research 
companies, indigenous peoples have no need to isolate compounds 
for mass marketing; rather, they rely on these plants mainly for local 
subsistence.51 
3. Utility 
The third major requirement for patentability is utility. 52 As the 
term suggests, the utility requirement mandates that an invention or 
discovery must be useful in order to be patented.53 This requirement 
is set out in § 101 of the Patent Act, and is based on Article I, Section 
8 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts.54 The utility require-
ment is a relatively easy one for a patent applicant to fulfill: an inven-
tion can be quite trivial, but if it has any fathomable use it will 
generally pass the utility requirement.55 In fact, even if an invention is 
inferior to a prior invention that serves the same purpose it can still 
be patented.56 
The only kinds of inventions or discoveries that have been pre-
cluded from patentability on the grounds of non-utility are those for 
46 SeelnreDillon, 919F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 937. 
47 SeeDillon, 919 F.2d at 692-93; see also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 937. 
48 See Ex parte Gray, 10 u.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1924 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1989); 
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 937. 
49 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 937. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 938, 940. 
52 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
53 See id. 
54 See U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis mine). 
55 See DURHAM, supra note 6, at 64. 
56 See id. 
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purposes deemed illegal or immoraI.57 For example, any invention 
useful only in committing a crime or fraud, such as a method of coun-
terfeiting currency, could be unpatentable for public policy reasons.58 
B. Current u.s. International Patent Policy 
In addition to maintaining domestic patent laws that discriminate 
against foreign indigenous knowledge, the United States also supports 
international agreements which impose traditional Western patent 
systems on less-developed, resource-rich countries.59 One such agree-
ment involving intellectual property rights is the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a re-
sult of the Uruguay Round of trade agreements.5O While fully support-
ing TRIPS, the United States has failed to ratity the 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention) which, unlike 
TRIPS, lists the sharing of benefits arising from the use of traditional 
knowledge as a goal.61 
1. TRIPS 
The goal of TRIPS is to "reduce distortions and impediments to 
international trade [by] taking into account the need to promote ef-
fective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to 
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade .... "62 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 936; Holwick, supra note 13, at 52-53; Sarma, supra 
note 11, at 107, 124; see also VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND 
KNOWLEDGE 81 (1997). Shiva notes that TRIPS was conceived and shaped by coalitions of 
U.S.,Japanese and European corporations. See generally id. 
60 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15. 1994. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
lC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
61 See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property and En-
viron'frU'ntal Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255, 255-56 (1998); 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60; Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 
I.L.M. 818, 837 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]; Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 423 (June 1, 1992) [hereinafter DEP'T STATE DISPATCH]; 
John Passacantando, Commentary, U.S. Insists on Loopholes for Toxics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2000. atB9. 
62 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, pmbl. 
78 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 21:69 
In short, the agreement requires that signatory nations adopt intellec-
tual property legislation that conforms to the treaty's provisions.63 
The provisions to which signatory nations must conform mirror 
the U.S. Patent Act's requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and 
utility.64 The agreement further states that a newly created World 
Trade Organization Council (WTO) for TRIPS will monitor compli-
ance with TRIPS' terms and oversee disputes between Member 
States.65 To date, the WTO's dispute resolution process has been suc-
cessfully used to resolve patent enforcement problems before trade 
sanctions were imposed.66 For instance, in 1997, both India and Paki-
stan had failed to comply with the requirement of enacting a system 
of intellectual property laws.67 This is because each of these countries 
has until 2005 to pass patent legislation that conforms with TRIPS.68 
63 See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60. Prior to TRIPS, international treaties, 
such as the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, and Washington Treaty, did not set re-
quirements for minimum levels of domestic intellectual property protection. See John E. 
Giust, Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and Developing Countries: Is TRIPS Working?, 8 
IND. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 69, 71 (1997). In contrast, TRIPS is replete with requirements 
for minimum levels of protection, thereby directly regulating intellectual property protec-
tion in each Member State. See id. 
64 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27 (1); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 953. 
Article 27(1) states: "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application .... " TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27 (1). 
Some scholars have argued that the phrase "capable of industrial application" includes 
only innovations meant to be used in the industrial sector. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 
939. Equating the phrase to the U.S. requirement of "useful" allows for a broader interpre-
tation. See id. However, as Roht-Arriaza points out, the very name of TRIPS--Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights--illustrates the treaty's application to goods subject to interna-
tional trade, excluding goods that are primarily used locally. See id. 
65 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, The 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, , A.I5, Sept. 27, 1994, available at 
1994 WL 761796 [hereinafter Administrative Action] . 
66 See Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How Do We Protect American Ingenuity?: Hear-
ings Before the House Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Pol'y and Trade of House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 
106th Congo (1999) (statement of Ambassador Richard W. Fisher, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative), available at 1999 WL 27595601 [hereinafter Fisher]; see, e.g., World Trade 
Organization, Pakistan-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
Mar. 7, 1997, available at1997 WL 371039 [hereinafterWTO]. 
67 See Fisher, supra note 66; see al50 Sarma, supra note 11, at 133. 
68 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 65(4); Giust, supra note 63, at 91. Under 
article 65, a developing country has five years from the date that TRIPS went into effect 
(Jan. 1, 1995) to apply its provisions. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 65(2). Addi-
tionally, to the extent that a developing country Member is obliged by the Agreement to 
extend product patent protection to areas of technology that were not formerly covered, it 
may delay the application of the provisions on product patents to such areas of technology 
for another five years. Id. art. 65 (4). 
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In the interim, TRIPS requires these countries to set up "mailbox" 
systems for holding patent applications until passage of new legisla-
tion.69 Mter these countries enact a permanent patent system that is 
in compliance with TRIPS requirements, the applications in the 
"mailbox" will receive priority dates as of the dates that they were 
originally submitted.70 The failure of India and Pakistan to comply 
with TRIPS' "mailbox" requirement led the United States to file dis-
pute resolution proceedings with the WTO against each country.71 
The proceeding against Pakistan resulted in a settlement requiring 
Pakistan to pass an ordinance creating a "mailbox" system.72 The 
United States dropped its complaint when Pakistan complied with this 
requirement in 1997.73 The case against India was resolved by the 
WTO Appellate Body, which upheld a panel ruling in favor of the 
United States.74 As a result, the Indian government promulgated a 
temporary ordinance to meet its "mailbox" rule obligations.75 In 1999, 
despite significant domestic opposition, India passed permanent legis-
lation entitled the Patents (Amendment) Act, which updated India's 
patent system in order to cover pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products. 76 
69 See id. art. 70(8) (a); Giust. supra note 63, at 91. Article 70(8) (a) of TRIPS reads: 
Where a Member does not make available as of the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products commensurate with its obligation under Article 27, that 
Member shall: (a) ... provide as from the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement a means by which applications for patents for such inven-
tions can be filed .... 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 70(8) (a). 
70 Seeid. art. 70(8) (b). 
71 See Fisher, supra note 66. 
72 See WTO, supra note 66. 
73 See id. 
74 See Fisher, supra note 66. 
75 See id.; World Trade Organization, Communication from the Permanent Mission of India, 
India-Patent Pmtection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Apr. 16, 1999, 
availablR at 1999 WI.. 231665. 
76 See Fisher, supra note 66. Prior to 1999, India's patent law did not protect agricul-
tural, horticultural or medical products or processes. See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia 
Baldia, Pmspects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 
VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 507, 519-20, 524-25 (1996). India's weak patent protection and 
protectionist laws favored domestic manufacturers of pharmaceuticals. See id. at 519-20. 
For instance, Indian producers could copy the latest drugs from throughout the world and 
sell them in the domestic market. See id. These companies quickly gained in efficiency and 
became very competitive in the world mal'ket. See id. 
The drawback to India's patent system was that Indian companies had no incentive to 
invest in research and development. See J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agree-
80 Boston College Third WOIid Law journal [Vol. 21:69 
In creating a system granting patents on agricultural and phar-
maceutical products, India was complying with article 27 of TRIPS.77 
Article 27 states that signatory countries must protect property rights 
in genetic plant resources "either by patents or by an effective sui 
generis system or by any combination thereof. "78 However, many peo-
ment: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. ThANSNAT'L L. 363, 379 (1996). Propo-
nents of TRIPS argue that expansion ofIndia's patent system to cover pharmaceuticals will 
encourage domestic companies to invest in the research and development of drugs to 
combat diseases of local importance. See id. However, opponents of TRIPS point to the 
experience of Italy, since its introduction of strong patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products in 1978. See EM. Scherer & Sandy Weisburst, Economic Effects of Strengthening Phar-
maceutical Patent Protection in Italy, 26 lIe 1009, 1023 (1995). Scherer and Weisburst con-
cluded that "the legitimization of drug product patents in Italy did not induce a marked 
shift in Italian pharmaceutical manufacturers' strategic emphasis from emulating drugs 
developed elsewhere to developing innovative drugs." Id. Furthermore, research and de-
velopment "expenditure growth ... did not accelerate after the patent regime transition" 
and "the number and character of new product launches did not change significantly." Id. 
Given the results in Italy, Scherer and Weisburst doubt that "significantly increased new 
drug development efforts are likely in the nations required under the . .. [TRIPS Agree-
ment] to offer drug product patents for the first time." Id. at 1024. 
77 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(3) (b). 
78 Id. Art. 27(3) (b) reads: 
Members may also exclude from patentability ... plants and animals other 
than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the production 
of plants or animals other than non-biological and micro-biological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 
Id. The TRIPS Agreement does not define what is meant by an "effective sui generis sys-
tem." See id. Yet, some commentators believe that tllis reference is intended to refer to a 
system modeled after the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV). See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
Dec. 2,1961,33 U.S.T. 2703 [hereinafter UPOV]; Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The 
International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. 
& POL'y lll, 124 (1996) (stating that European nations adopted sui generis plant protec-
tion under UPOV rather than patent-based protection); J. Benjamin Bai, Comment, Pro-
tecting Plant Hl1ieties under TRIPS and NAFFA: Should Utility Patents be Available for Plants?, 32 
TEXAS INT'L LJ. 139, 140 (1997) (suggesting that the UPOV is a suitable system of protec-
tion on the international level) . The UPOV sets minimum standards and assigns rights for 
both the finding and breeding of new plant species. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 94l. 
Unlike patents, plant breeder rights allow the free use of a protected variety in order to 
breed and commercialize other new varieties. Id. Originally, the UPOV let farmers save 
seeds from season to season witllOut paying royalties to the seed companies. Id. However, 
since its inception, the UPOV has been altered to give more protection to plant breeders 
and less to farmers. Id. In addition, like under a patent system, traditional farmers are not 
allowed protection for their innovative breeding work under UPOV. Id. To obtain UPOV 
protection, a plant must be: differentiated from existing plants through "precise recogni-
tion and description"; uniform or "sufficiently homogeneous"; and "stable in its essential 
characteristics." Id. (quoting UPOV, art. 4). While most developed states are parties to 
UPOV, practically no developing states have signed. Id. 
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pIe in developing countries that have signed TRIPS are critical of as-
signing property rights in plant resources.79 This requirement does 
not take into account the differing cultural perspectives of indigenous 
groups in member states regarding the commodification of biological 
resources.80 In particular, it disregards the contributions of indige-
nous groups in discovering and nurturing the medicinal and agricul-
tural uses of plants over the centuries.8! 
Historically, international law has allowed sovereign nations con-
trol over all persons and things within their territory, which means 
that lesser developed nations could act to protect the cultural knowl-
edge of their people.82 However, these countries were economically 
pressured by developed countries to sign TRIPS, which prevents them 
from passing protectionist laws.83 Many lesser developed nations suc-
cumbed to this pressure as a means of equalizing their economies 
with those of developed nations at the expense of their indigenous 
populations who consider their cultural knowledge as community, 
rather than private, property.84 
TRIPS has effectively resulted in continued exploitation of in-
digenous knowledge.85 Some scholars have referred to this exploita-
tion as a form of modern-day imperialism.86 In this regard, article 27 
of the TRIPS Agreement is in direct opposition to the goals of the 
Biodiversity Convention.87 
79 See Sarma, supra note 11, at 113; Indigenous Peoples' Seattle Declaration on tlu Occasion of 
tlu Third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade OIganization, § 3 (a), at http://www.nativeweb. 
org/manifestos/seattle_wto.html (Nov. 3D-Dec. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Seattle Declaration]. 
80 See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 89, 122-23 (1993); Sarma, supra note 11, at 113. 
81 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 936; Sarma, supra note 11, at 113; see also Downes, 
supra note 14, at 277-78. 
82 See Odek, supra note 10, at 168. 
83 See Sarma, supra note 11, at 109. TRIPS has been criticized for requiring developing 
countries to pass strong patent laws. See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 
27 of tlu TRIPS Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Count1ies Toward the 
Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41,52 (1998). Developing countries tend 
to regard patents as a means for developed countries "to maintain their head start in tech-
nology and deny a transfer of technology so that [the developing countries] can begin 
their own research and development industries." Bosselmann, supra note 78, at 127. 
84 See Sarma, supra note 11, at 109. 
85 Seeid. at 111-12,118,125. 
86 See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note 59; Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, 
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 613 (1996). 
87 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, pmbl., art. 8(j); TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 60, art. 27; Sarma, supra note 11, at 121. 
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2. The Biodiversity Convention 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, concluded in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, endeavors to conserve the 
world's biological resources and to forward sustainable develop-
ment.88 Unlike TRIPS, the Biodiversity Convention recognizes and 
acknowledges the value of indigenous knowledge of regional biologi-
cal resources.89 Article 8(j) of the Convention states that respect and 
preservation should extend to "innovations and practices of indige-
nous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant 
for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity .... ''90 
In addition, article 9 of the Convention urges nations to include in-
digenous and local communities in the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity.91 In so doing, the Biodiversity Convention 
recognizes, for the first time in an international treaty, the important 
role played by indigenous populations in the gathering and preserva-
tion of cultural knowledge regarding regional biodiversity.92 
Despite its laudable goals, the Biodiversity Convention has been 
criticized for investing in the governments of developing nations 
rather than in local communities, the sovereign right to control access 
to biodiversity located within their borders.93 In these nations, the re-
sult has been a great incentive for prospecting agreements between 
governments and foreign researchers.94 Prospecting agreements "pro-
vide a means by which the global community can turn local govern-
ments and peoples into biodiversity stakeholders, thus creating a vi-
able economic alternative to competing ecologically destructive 
sources of income. ''95 However, prospecting will not fulfill the goals of 
the Biodiversity Convention unless each agreement provides compen-
sation to the indigenous and local groups who have preserved their 
88 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, art. 1; McManis, supra note 61, at 255. 
89 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, pmbl. 
90 [d. art. 8(j). 
91 See id. art. 9. The Biodiversity Convention seeks to help indigenous people in lesser 
developed countries by recognizing their governments' sovereign rights over indigenous 
knowledge within their borders. See Steven M. Rubin & Stanwood W. Fish, Biodiversity Pros-
pecting: Using Innovative Contractual Pmvisions to Foster EthnoiJiological Knowledge, Technology, 
and Conservation, 5 COLO.]. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 23, 34-36 (1994) (discussing Biodiver-
sity Convention, articles 11, 15, 16 and 18 regarding importance of proper compensation 
to local people). 
92 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 949. 
93 See id. 
94 See Rubin & Fish, supra note 91, at 35; Sarma, supra note 11, at 122. 
95 Rubin & Fish, supra note 91, at 32. 
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traditional knowledge.96 Presently, the goal of the Biodiversity Con-
vention to ensure that the contributions of indigenous populations 
are respected is thwarted in that the holders of traditional knowledge 
are still exploited.97 The only difference is that the exploitation under 
the Biodiversity Convention is by their own governments.98 
Another roadblock to the success of the Biodiversity Convention 
is the failure of the United States to ratify it.99 Since its inception, the 
United States has been critical of the Biodiversity Convention because 
it would impair American intellectual property rights,loo The State 
Department voiced the United States' concerns about the Convention 
in 1992, stating that it focused on intellectual property rights "as a 
constraint to the transfer of technology rather than as a prerequi-
site. "101 
The Clinton Administration eventually signed the Biodiversity 
Convention in 1993, but only after considerable lobbying efforts by 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms.102 These firms had changed 
their position from opposition of the Biodiversity Convention to pro-
motion of it, due to fear that continued opposition would exclude 
U.S. companies from opportunities to explore genetic resources in 
developing countries and preclude U.S. involvement in future nego-
tiations interpreting the exact meaning of the Convention.103 Mter 
signing the Biodiversity Convention, Clinton stated that future legisla-
tion ratifying the Convention would illustrate the White House's in-
terpretation and would highlight the United States' concern that the 
Convention fails to protect intellectual property rights,I04 However, 
Congress never took up the issue of the Convention and has yet to 
ratify it.105 
96 See id. at 35. 
97 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, art. 8(j); Sarma, supra note 11, at 122-23. 
98 See Sarma, supra note 11, at 123. 
99 See McManis, supra note 61, at 257. 
100 See id. at 256. Shortly before the "Earth Summit" in Rio, President Bush expressed 
U.S. opposition to the Biodiversity Convention. See id. The United States interpreted the 
Biodiversity Convention as allowing countries to require technology transfer in exchange 
for access to genetic resources, and, therefore, found it unacceptable. See Amy E. Carroll, 
Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of u.s. Patent Law, 
44 AM. U. L. RE\,. 2433, 2477-78 (1995). 
101 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, supra note 61. 
102 See McManis, supra note 61, at 256. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 257. 
105 See id. 
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Despite the Biodiversity Convention's flaws, its underlying as-
sumption that indigenous communities should share in the profits of 
inventions resulting from their traditional knowledge is a valid one.106 
The failure of the U.S. Congress to ratify the Biodiversity Convention 
is yet another way in which U.S. patent policy fails to acknowledge the 
value of indigenous cultural knowledge. The real life discriminatory 
effect of U.S. patent law and U.S. international patent policy is well 
illustrated by the controversy surrounding the ayahuasca patent. 
II. THE AYAHUASCA PATENT 
As described above, upon learning of Loren Miller's patent on 
ayahuasca, many indigenous tribes of South America organized to 
oppose the patent on the ground that the vine was a sacred religious 
symbol and a known medicinal herb.107 This effort by the indigenous 
tribesmen and their attorneys proved very successful, and on Novem-
ber 3, 1999, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
ultimately rejected Miller's patent. lOS This section will describe in 
more detail the history of this patent and its eventual revocation. 
A Issuance of the Patent 
In 1974, a tribe in Ecuador gave Loren Miller samples of a local 
ayahuasca vine.109 In return for the plants, Miller claims to have built 
a school for the tribe's people.110 Upon returning to the United 
States, Miller cultivated the plant in Hawaii and developed a stable 
variety that was eligible for a patent.111 He then formed a small com-
pany, International Plant Medicine, to investigate whether the plant 
had any useful purpose.ll2 
In 1986, Miller obtained a plant patent on his ayahuasca, which 
he called "Da Vine."113 In his patent application, he stated merely that 
he had originally obtained the ayahuasca from a "domestic garden in 
the Amazon rain-forest of South America. "114 He claimed that Da Vine 
106 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 949. 
107 See Wiser, supra note I, § 2. 
108 See id. § 5. 
109 See Pollack, supra note 15, at C4. 
110 See id. 
III See id. 
112 See id. Mr. Miller has said that the effort to find a distributable medicinal use for 
ayahuasca was unsuccessful and he has no plans to study it further. See id. 
113 See U.S. Plant Patent No. 5751 (issued June 17, 1986); Wiser, supra note 1, § 2. 
114 U.S. Plant Patent No. 5751 (issued June 17, 1986); see Wiser, supra note 1, § 2. 
2001] QJ.testioni ng [J. S. Patent Policy 85 
represented a new and unique variety of ayahuasca distinct from 
other forms primarily because of the color of its flower petals. l15 
In 1994, the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of 
the Amazon Basin (COICA) discovered that Miller had obtained a 
patent on ayahuasca.1l6 Perplexed at the idea of an outsider "discover-
ing" a plant that had been used by their ancestors since ancient times, 
some tribes in Ecuador reacted in a hostile fashion.1l7 One coalition 
actually issued a threat of bodily harm to Miller should he ever return 
to the Amazon Basin.1l8 This threat, in turn, led the United States to 
cancel all aid to the indigenous tribal groUp.1l9 COICA also learned 
that Miller intended to build a pharmaceutical laboratory in Ecuador 
to process ayahuasca.120 This discovery prompted fear among COICA 
members that a bilateral intellectual property reciprocity agreement 
being forged between the United States and Ecuador would force in-
digenous peoples to recognize Miller's proprietary rights over a plant 
which they viewed as sacred.l2l 
B. PTO Re-Examination of the Ayahuasca Patent 
COICA and the Amazon Coalition both decided that the best way 
to assert tribal rights to their cultural knowledge and their sacred 
plant was to object formally to Miller's patent.122 The tribal organiza-
tions set out to use the U.S. patent law as a tool in their fight.123 They 
began working with attorneys at the Center for International Envi-
ronmental Law (CIEL) to prepare a Request for Re-examination of 
the patent.124 
Attorneys from CIEL filed the Request for Reexamination of the 
ayahuasca patent on March 30, 1999.125 In their Request, they argued 
115 SeeV.s. Plant Patent No. 5751 (issued June 17, 1986). 
116 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 2. 
m See Lambrecht, supra note 7, at AS. 
118 See id. The indigenous tribes declared Mr. Miller an "enemy of indigenous peoples" 
and stated that if Miller or his associates returned to the Amazon, tribes "will not be re-
sponsible for the consequences to their physical safety." See id. (quoting COICA). 
119 See id. The u.S.-based Inter-American Foundation stopped all aid to COICA in 
1998, after allotting more than $500,000 in recent years. See id. 
120 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 2. 
121 See id. To the tribes, the ayahuasca vine has a similar religious significance to the 
Christian cross. See id. § 1. 
122 See id. § 3. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 3; see also DURHAM, supra note 6, at 38 (explaining that re-
examination allows the Patent Office to reconsider and reject previously issued patents in 
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that prior art revealed that Da Vine was not, in fact, distinct or new, 
thus failing the Patent Act's requirement of novelty.126 Miller's patent 
application described ayahuasca as it was already illustrated in sci-
entific literature and known by indigenous Amazonian peoples.127 
The CIEL attorneys further argued that the Da Vine patent violated 
the Plant Patent Act because the vine is "found in an uncultivated 
state. "128 Lastly, the attorneys charged that the patent on ayahuasca 
violated the Patent Act's utility requirement because issuing a patent 
on a plant that is sacred to indigenous peoples violates notions of 
public policy and morality.l29 
On May 28, 1999, based on the fact that Da Vine was identical to 
other specimens of ayahuasca found in V.S. herbarium collections, 
the PTO granted the Reexamination Request.13o In November 1999, 
after reviewing the facts, the PTO ordered the rejection of Miller's 
patent on the narrow ground that the same plant had been described 
in herbarium sheets in Chicago's Field Museum over a year· prior to 
Miller's application.131 
By revoking the ayahuasca patent on these narrow grounds, the 
PTO failed to address the more significant issues of whether the prior 
use by indigenous tribes or the fact that the plant was a sacred relig-
ious symbol precluded issuance of the patent.132 In the absence of any 
attempt by Congress or the V.S. PTO to address the issues raised by 
the ayahuasca patent, many developing nations have enacted laws 
making it more difficult for researchers from developed nations to 
study indigenous plants and animals for possible medicinal value.133 
light of newly uncovered prior art). While the public is normally barred from patent 
prosecutions, anyone can request a reexamination, ..... including a licensee, an accused 
infringer, a government agency or someone who simply likes to meddle. All that is neces-
sary to begin is knowledge of a prior patent or printed publication that casts doubt on the 
validity of some or all of the patent claims." DURHAM, supra note 6, at 38-39 (footnotes 
omitted). 
126 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 3; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
127 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 3. 
128 See 35 U.S.C. § 161; Wiser, supra note 1, § 3; see also DURHAM, supra note 6, at 177 
(explaining that a patent cannot issue for the discovery of a plant in the wild). 
129 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 3. 
130 See id. § 4. 
131 See CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAw & COALITION FOR AMAZONIAN PEOPLES & THEIR 
ENV'T, U.S. PATENT OFFICE ADMITS ERROR, REJECTS PATENT CLAIM ON SACRED "AYA-
HUASCA" PLANT 2, at http://ciel.org/AyahuascaRejectionPR.html (Nov. 4, 1999). This is 
the first time that herbarium sheets have been used to bar someone from obtaining a plant 
patent. See Wiser, supra note 1, § 5 (B). 
132 See Shiva, supra note 10; Wiser, supra note 1, § 5 (A). 
133 See Pollack, supra note 15, at AI, C4. 
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In particular, the ayahuasca patent controversy has led Ecuador to re-
ject a proposed bilateral intellectual property rights agreement with 
the United States. l34 Ecuador was likely on its way to signing the 
agreement prior to this controversy.135 As the ayahuasca controversy 
demonstrates, u.s. patent policy (and policies of other developed na-
tions) inevitably leads to international conflict and protectionist re-
sponse from developing nations. As a result, the resources of develop-
ing nations are often effectively cut off from the world, to the 
detriment of nations on both sides of the dispute. In order to effec-
tively prevent similar reaction from developing nations in the future, 
the time is ripe to re-evaluate and reform U.S. patent policy. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF U.S. PATENT LAws 
In order to avoid the ill effects of biopiracy that are demon-
strated by the ayahuasca controversy, the United States should reform 
its patent policy in three distinct ways. First, the PTO should give 
greater consideration to the morality component of the utility re-
quirement when deliberating an invention's patentability.136 For in-
stance, Loren Miller's patent should have been refused on the basis 
that it was immoral to grant a property right in a religious symbol.137 
Second, the United States should recognize foreign prior use as a 
prior art under the Patent Act's novelty requirement.138 Such recogni-
tion would prevent biopirates like Loren Miller from claiming an ex-
clusive patent right over plants which have been used by indigenous 
populations for centuries.139 Furthermore, recognizing prior foreign 
use would likely help to convince underdeveloped nations to stop re-
stricting researcher access to their diverse ecosystems.140 Finally, the 
United States and other signatory nations should reject TRIPS, as it 
presently reads, in favor of a reformed treaty which provides a more 
134 SeeCIEL, supra note 6, § IV(D). 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 Seeid. 
138 See Kadidal, supra note 19, at 402-03. 
139 CIEL, supra note 6, § III; see also Kadidal, supra note 19, at 396-97,400-01. 
140 See CIEL, supra note 6, § III. Although adding foreign prior use as prior art refer-
ence would reduce the number of biotechnology patents issued, this decrease in the avail-
able monetary compensation for developers could be offset by setting up licensing agree-
ments with indigenous communities wherein the corporate developer shares with the 
community that supplied the traditional knowledge any royalties from successful drugs or 
agricultural products. See Laurie Goering, Brazil Wants Cut of Biotech Firms' Jungle Plunder; 
CHI. 1'RIB., Apr. 6, 1999, at 1. 
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equitable distribution of the rights over, and benefits deriving from, 
the world's biodiversity.l41 To that end, the United States should sup-
port an effort to integrate some of the goals of the 1992 Rio Biodiver-
sity Convention into the TRIPS agreement. l42 
A. Enforcing the Morality Component of the U.S. Patent Act 
1. Genesis and Rebirth ofthe Patent Act's Morality Component 
There is sufficient ground in the development of the utility re-
quirement to expand its morality component to include things like 
religious symbols. l43 The history of the morality component of the 
utility requirement can be traced to an 1817 Massachusetts case 
authored by Justice Joseph Story.144 In that case, Lowell v. Lewis, the 
court found that an invention relating to the construction of water 
pumps satisfied the utility requirement of the Patent ACt.145 The court 
reached its decision by concluding, "[a]ll that the law requires is, that 
the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, 
good policy, or sound morals of society. The word 'useful,' therefore, 
is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or 
immoral."l46 Thus, from its inception, the utility requirement drew its 
meaning, in part, from a reliance on morality.l47 
Following the Lowell decision, other courts in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries generally struck down patents on the basis of 
immorality in two types of cases. l4S First, courts struck down inven-
141 See Item 8: The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biodiver-
sity, n 13-18, WfO Doc. Wf/CTE/W/65 (Sept. 29, 1997) (communication from India) 
[hereinafter India Paper]; Shiva, supm note 10. 
142 See India Paper, supra note 141, it 13-18; Seattle Declamtion, supm note 79, § 3(d); 
Shiva, supra note 10; see also CUTS CTR. FOR INT'L TRADE ECON. & ENV'T, BRIEFING PAPER, 
TRIPS AND BIODIVERSITY, at http://Cuts-India.org/trade-susdevl.htm (1999) [hereinafter 
CUTS]. 
143 See Wiser, supra note 1, § 3; CIEL, supm note 6, § IV(D). See generally Tol-O-Matic, 
Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
Lowell V. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); U.S. Patent and Trade-
mat-k Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans, Media Advi-
sory 98-6, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm (Apr. 1, 1998) 
[hereinafter PTO, Media Advisory] . 
144 See Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 10 19. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
148 See Robert Patrick Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System 
& Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1062-66 (1988); Brett G. Alten, Note, Left 
to One's Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical Procedures, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. l\{E-
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tions used to defraud buyers.149 Second, courts denied patents for 
items useful for gambling or similarly immoral activity.l5o 
Since early in the twentieth century, federal courts have stopped 
applying the moral utility doctrine to reject patent applications.I51 
Many scholars argue that this is based on the fact that moral norms 
can change over the course of only a few years and that the PTO is 
not institutionally equipped to make moral judgments.152 Rather, it is 
argued, the PTO should limit itself to deciding issues of novelty.153 
Since the middle of this century, the courts have done just that.154 
However, with the recent explosion of the biotechnology industry 
and the moral questions this explosion has raised, the moral utility 
doctrine is experiencing a re-birth, both in the United States and 
abroad.155 In particular, the PTO has recently issued an advisory citing 
Lowell and the moral utility doctrine, as did the federal circuit court in 
Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Product-Und Marketing GesellschaJt, m.h.H.156 
Additionally, the European Union has used a form of the moral utility 
doctrine as a means of rejecting immoral or destructive patents.157 
Finally, article 27 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement allows for the barring of 
DIA & ENT. LJ. 837, 845-46 (1998); Thomas A. Magnani, Note, The Patentability of Hwnan-
Animal Chimeras, l4 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 443, 451 (1999). 
149 See, e.g., Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1900) (holding that proc-
ess for artificially producing spots on tobacco leaves used to wrap cigars, such that leaves 
resembled those used to wrap high-quality cigars, was unpatentable for lack of utility); see 
Merges, supra note 148, at 1062; Magnani, supra note 148, at 451. 
150 See Alten, supra note 148, at 845; Magnani, supra note 148, at 451. 
151 See DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTABILITY, VALID-
ITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 4.03, at 4-17 to 4-24.1 (1999) (reviewing relevant case law); Al-
ten, supra note 148, at 846. 
152 See CHISUM, supra note 151, at 4-17; Merges, supra note l48, at 1062-66. 
153 See Carrie F. Walter, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent Practice and the 
Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. LJ. 1025, 1026 (1998); see also 
CHISUM, supra note 151, at 4-17; Merges, supra note 148, at 1062, 1067-68, 1075. 
154 See, e.g., Chicago Patent v. Genco, 124 F.2d 725, 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1941) (holding 
that pinball is different from gambling in order to uphold a patent on pinball machine); 
Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., l4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885, 1886 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (upholding 
patent on radar detector despite claims that its sole purpose was to circumvent police at-
tempts to enforce speed limit); Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802, 803 (P.T.O. Bd. 
App. 1977) (upholding patent on slot machine); see Alten, supra note l48, at 846-47. 
155 See Magnani, supra note 148, at 453. 
156 See Rick Weiss, US Ruling Aids Opponent of Patents for Life Forms, WASH. POST,June 17, 
1999, at A2 [hereinafter Weiss, US Ruling]. See generally Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-
Und Marketing Gesellschaft, m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1991); PTO, Media 
Advisory, supra note 143. 
157 See Council Directive 98/44/EC, art. 6, 1998 OJ. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Council 
Directive]; Magnani, supra note l48, at 453. 
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patent protection if "commercial exploitation" of an invention would 
harm public policy or morality.15S 
2. The Revived Morality Component in Action: Recent Decisions and 
Legislation 
a. Human-Animal Chimera 
One instance of the recent revival of the morality component of 
the U.S. Patent Act's utility requirement involved a proposed patent 
on a human animal chimera.159 A human animal chimera is a geneti-
cally engineered creature composed of some human and some animal 
cells.160 In December of 1997, Dr. Stuart Newman, a cellular biologist 
at New York Medical College, and Jeremy Rifkin, a biotechnology ac-
tivist opposed to the patenting of life forms, applied for a patent on 
the production of human-animal chimeras that could be up to fifty 
percent human.161 The co-applicants hoped either to forestall other 
scientists from creating human-animal chimeras for the twenty-year 
term of a patent or that dle PTO would reject the patent due to the 
moral questions such a creature would raise.162 
As it turned out, the PTO quickly issued an advisory opinion to 
the media stating that it would likely reject the patent.163 In particular, 
the PTO stated that it would not "issue a patent for an invention of 
incredible or specious utility or for inventions whose utilization is not 
adequately disclosed in the application."I64 While this sentence, taken 
alone, merely illustrates the PTO's intention to question the proposed 
utility of the invention, the advisory went on to state that, "the courts 
have interpreted the utility requirement to exclude inventions 
deemed to be 'injurious to the wellbeing, good policy, or good morals 
158 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(2). 
159 See generally Magnani, supra note 148; Weiss, US Ruling, supra note 156, at A2; PTO, 
Media Advisory, supra note 143. 
160 See Magnani, supra note 148, at 445. In ancient Greek mythology, a chimera was a 
fire-spewing monster with the head of a lion, body of a goat, and tail of a snake. See WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 389 (ed. 1986). Recently, advances in 
biotechnology have resulted in permutations of species called chimera. See Magnani, supra 
note 148, at 443. Some suggested future uses for such inventions are using them as subjects 
of research and as organ donors. See id. at 456. It is theorized that humans would be less 
likely to reject organs from an animal with some human characteristics. See id. 
161 See Magnani, supra note 148, at 443; Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-
Human Creatures, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12 [hereinafter Weiss, Patent Sought]. 
162 See Magnani, supra note 148, at 443; Weiss, Patent Sought, supra note 161, at A12. 
163 See PTO, Media Advisory, supra note 143. 
164Id. 
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of society. ' "165 This language is quoted directly from Justice Story's 
opinion in Lowell.166 By citing the moral utility doctrine illustrated in 
Lowell, the PTO intimated that it would consider the morality of pat-
enting a life form.167 This indication was contrary to earlier federal 
court decisions that upheld patents on transgenic animals including 
animals with human genes or organs. l68 
In relying on Lowell, the PTO was following the recent example 
of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 169 In Tol-O-Matic v. Proma Product-
Und Marketing GesellschaJt, a 1991 decision, the court upheld a patent 
on a rodless piston-cylinder.170 In arriving at its opinion, the court 
noted that 35 U.S.C. § 101 has "been interpreted to exclude inven-
tions deemed to be immoral."171 Although neither party argued that 
the rodless piston-cylinder was immoral, the court went on to cite the 
Lowell opinion extensively in upholding the patent.172 It has been sug-
gested that the willingness of the Federal Circuit to cite to such a con-
troversial doctrine in a setting where the morality argument was not 
even raised indicates that the courts may be preparing to invoke the 
doctrine with greater frequency in the future.173 
Ultimately, the PTO did reject the human-animal chimera patent 
in June of 1999, in part because the invention "embraces" a human 
being and is, therefore, unpatentable on the longstanding policy of 
the PTO that human beings are not patentable.174 However, the PTO 
165 Id. (quoting Judge Story as quoted in Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Pr01TUl Produkt-und Market-
ing Gesellschaft m.h.H, 945 F.2d at 1546, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1991». 
166 See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); PTO, Me-
dia Advisory, supra note 143. 
167 SeePTO, Media Advisory, supra note 143. 
168 See id. See generally Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1427 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interfer-
ences 1987) (rejecting claim that genetically engineered oysters were naturally occurring 
subject matter but rejecting the patent on obviousness); Transgenic Non-Human Mam-
mals, U.S. Patent. No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988) (patent for mouse injected with 
human hormones) [hereinafter Harvard Mouse Patent]. 
169 See Tol-O-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1552-53; PTO, Media Advisory, supra note 143. 
170 Tol-O-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1547. 
171 See id. at 1552. 
172 See id. at 1552-53; Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); 
Magnani, supra note 148, at 453. 
173 See Magnani, supra note 148, at 453 (new type of cylinder would not be considered 
immoral, so there was no reason to bring in the moral utility argument). But see Juicy 
Whip, Inc. v. Orange Ban, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating moral 
utility doctrine has not been broadly applied by courts in recent years and upholding pat-
ent depite fact that invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating another 
product). 
174 See Weiss, US Ruling, supra note 156, atA2 (quoting PTO opinion); PTO, Media Ad-
visory, supra note 143. 
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did not say in the holding why other animals injected with human ge-
netic material do not embrace a human being.175 Thus, the holding 
that a being that is fifty percent human is too human to be patentable 
appears to be, in part, a rejection of a patent based on moral ques-
tionability.176 
Dr. Newman and Mr. Rifkin, the human-animal chimera patent 
applicants, have already filed an appeal of the PTO decision rejecting 
their patent, in hopes that the case will eventually reach the Supreme 
Court for a long-awaited limitation of the holding of Diamond v. Chak-
robarty, which upheld a patent on a genetically-altered bacterium.177 It 
was that case that led to the inevitable patents of genetically-
engineered animals,178 The United States courts and the PTO have re- . 
opened the door for using the moral utility doctrine to reject immoral 
patents.179 This positive step could make patents like the one on aya-
huasca less likely to be upheld.180 
b. The European Union's Use of Morality Determinations to Bar Patents 
In addition to the progress made in the United States in resur-
recting the moral utility doctrine, the European Union has employed 
a similar doctrine.181 In July 1998, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union issued a directive expressly allowing 
patents on genetically engineered plant and animal species, but for-
bidding biotechnological applications that "would be contrary to or-
dre public or morality. "182 
The term "ordre public" derives from French law and is similar to 
the notion of public policy.183 However, "ordre public" encompasses a 
few separate and distinct ideas that are not covered by the Anglo-
175 See Weiss, US Ruling, supra note 156, atA2. 
176 See id.; PTO, Media Advisory, supra note 143. 
177 See Diamond v. Chakrobarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Weiss, US Ruling, supra note 
156, atA2. 
178 See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309; Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1428 (Bd. Pat. App. 
& Interf. 1987); Harvard Mouse Patent, supra note 168. 
179 See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 
at 1546, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir.1991); PTO, Media Advisory, supra note 143. 
180 See CIEL, supra note 6, § IV(D). The attorneys at CIEL argue that a case by case 
analysis of the morality of patent applications is not feasible. See id. Rather, they suggest 
that the PTO should develop new procedures and principles that would aid it in setting 
guidelines for the patenting of living things. See id. 
181 See Council Directive, supra note 157, art. 6; see also Magnani, supra note 148, at 453. 
182 See Council Directive, supra note 157, arts. 3, 6. 
183 Timothy G. Ackerman, Comment, Dis'ordr'e'ly Loopholes: TRIPS Pateut Protection, 
GATT and theEC], 32 TEX. INT'L LJ. 489, 495 (1997). 
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American doctrine of public policy.184 First, according to the doctrine 
of ordre public, judges have some discretion to bar enforcement of 
contracts which they find to offend public order.185 Second, there are 
statutory requirements within the ordre public which limit private 
contracts.186 Finally, the notion of ordre public can be used to bar ap-
plication of a foreign law which would normally apply, on the basis 
that the foreign law "would sanction conduct that offends against the 
forum's concept of fundamental norms."187 
In 1998, the European Parliament and the Council of the Euro-
pean Union issued a directive on the legal protection of biotechno-
logical inventions.188 Included in the directive was an article making 
unpatentable inventions whose "commercial exploitation would be 
contrary to ordre public or morality.189 That article lists human clon-
ing, commercialization of human embryos, and modifying the genetic 
makeup of animals in ways likely to cause them suffering without any 
apparent benefit as examples of inventions which would be rejected 
on the basis of offending morality or being contrary to ordre pub-
lic.19o 
At this point, it is unclear whether Europe's new patent laws will 
have any effect on V.S. domestic pOlicy.19I However, this is an area in 
which the United States has been lagging behind in legislation.192 
Therefore, it is very possible that Congress and the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC) could look to Europe in formulating 
V.S. pOlicy.193 But, regardless of Europe's effect on U.S. domestic pol-
icy regarding biotechnology, its provision against granting patents on 
184 See id. 
185 See CIVIL CODE [C. CIV], arts. 1131, 1133 (Fr.); DENNIS LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY 6 
(1953); Ackerman, supra note 183, at 495. 
186 See CIVIL CODE [C. CIV], art. 6 (Fr.); Ackerman, supra note 183, at 495. Article 6 of 
the Civil Code reads, "One may not derogate by private agreements from laws which in-
volve public policy and morality." CIVIL CODE [C. CIY], art. 6 (Fr.). 
187 See Ackerman, supra note 183, at 495 (quoting M. Forde, The "Ordre Public" Exception 
and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions, 29 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 259, 259-60 (1981)). 
188 See generally Council Directive, supra note 157. 
189 See id. art. 6. 
190 See id. 
191 See Magnani, supra note 148, at 454. 
192 See id. 
193 See id.; see also Walter, supra note 153, at 1045. The NBAC was formed on October 3, 
1995 by executive order of President Clinton. See Walter, supra note 153, at 1026, 1045. Up 
to that point, the U.S. was one of few industrialized nations without a commission to exam-
ine bioethics. See id. at 1045. President Clinton stated that one of the primary tasks of the 
NBAC was to review the propriety and social effects of issuing patents on genes. See id. 
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inventions which are contrary to "ordre public or morality" has al-
ready been included in the TRIPS agreement.194 
c. Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement 
Finally, like the European Union and the United States, TRIPS 
has placed greater emphasis on morality.l95 The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, in article 27 (2), provides that 
states may exclude an invention from patent protection if prevention 
of "commercial exploitation" of that invention in their territory is 
"necessary" in order to "protect ordre public or morality. "196 This provi-
sion allows that if prevention of "commercial exploitation" of an in-
vention is "necessary" to protect "the ordre public or morality," and if 
exclusion of the invention from patentability is the only way to pre-
vent its commercial exploitation, then the state may bar the patent.197 
Thus, under article 27 (2), states may only exclude an invention from 
patentability on the basis of ordre public where granting a patent 
would result in commercial exploitation of the invention, and that 
such commercialization would offend the state's concept of funda-
mental norms.198 
The inclusion of this clause in the TRIPS Agreement has led to 
some speculation that it creates a loophole in the requirement that 
Member States create adequate systems for protecting intellectual 
property rightS.199 Some scholars argue that this clause could espe-
cially hinder the goal that Member States protect technology.2oo How-
ever, the application of the clause by Member States is limited in that 
patent protection can only be denied if preventing commercial ex-
ploitation of an invention is necessary to protect ordre public or mo-
rality.201 
194 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(2). 
195 See id. 
196 Id. 
197 See Ackerman, supra note 183, at 496. 
198 See Forde, supra note 187, at 261 (discussing treaties that help determine what law 
will be used in a transnational dispute and the exceptions provided in that law); Acker-
man, supra note 183, at 496. 
199 See Ackerman, supra note 183, at 496-97. 
200 See id. 
201 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(2); Ackerman, supra note 183, at 492. 
It is useful to look to prior GATI decisions concerning the definition of the word neces-
sary in order to appreciate the limited scope of this exception. See Ackerman, supra note 
183, at 506-07. 
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By allowing Member States to exclude patent protection on cer-
tain inventions for public policy reasons, article 27 (2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement is in line with the morality component of the utility re-
quirement of the U.S. Patent Act. 202 The inclusion of morality consid-
erations in determining an invention's patentability, therefore, com-
ports with both domestic law and an international treaty.203 Therefore, 
by applying a morality test in determining whether a patent should 
issue, U.S. courts and the U.S. PTO would be applying the Patent Act 
correctly and would not be violating the TRIPS Agreement.204 
B. Foreign Prior Use 
In addition to expanding the application of the morality compo-
nent, the United States should also reconsider the exclusion of for-
eign prior use as a bar to granting a patent.205 In particular, under the 
novelty requirement of the Patent Act, the United States should rec-
ognize foreign prior use in the form of traditional knowledge as a 
prior art reference.206 
1. Recognizing Traditional Knowledge as Prior Art Is Consistent with 
the Mission of U.S. Intellectual Property Law 
In recognizing cultural knowledge as a prior art reference the 
U.S. Patent Act would remain consistent with its underlying purpose 
of granting property rights in new and useful inventions.207 In the 
United States, intellectual property law has its basis in the U.S. Consti-
tution, which states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries. "208 The award of patents for inven-
tions is one means of fulfilling the mission of promoting the progress 
202 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(2); Tol-O-
Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53; 
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018,1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
203 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(2); Tol-O-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1552-53; 
Lowell, 15 F.Cas. at 1019. 
204 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(2); Tol-O-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1553; Lowell, 
15 F. Cas. at 1019. 
205 See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 371, 396-97; see also 
Shiva, supra note 10. 
206 Kadidal, supra note 19, at 371, 396-97; Shiva, supra note 10. 
207 See Kadidal, supra note 19, at 371, 396-97; CIEL, supra note 6, intro. 
208 U.S. CONST., art. 1 § 8, d. 8. 
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of science and useful arts.209 However, financially rewarding inventors 
by granting exclusive patent rights is only one means of progressing 
science and the useful arts, it is not an end in itself.210 Another impor-
tant means of promoting innovation is by way of the patent applica-
tion and publication process itself.211 Patent applications disclose to 
the public the basis for inventions.212 By acknowledging the prior art 
used, inventors can at once recognize their predecessors and provide 
a complete view of the inventive process relied upon by future inven-
tors.213 Such acknowledgment is just given that indigenous people of-
ten facilitate the ability of transnational corporations to access these 
substances by helping a corporations' researchers to identify the natu-
ral sources of various compounds.214 
The Center for International Environmental Law, whose attor-
neys successfully challenged the ayahuasca patent on behalf of 
COICA, argues that the disclosure of traditional knowledge that forms 
part of the prior art promotes the progress of science and the useful 
arts in two ways.215 First, it would recognize the holders of cultural 
knowledge of local biological resources, providing incentive for con-
tinued use and maintenance of indigenous knowledge systems.216 
Such an incentive could work to slow the rapid loss of traditional 
knowledge due to cultural assimilation and the destruction of local 
biological resources.217 Second, by encouraging the maintenance of 
traditional knowledge systems through positive incentives, a reformed 
U.S. Patent Act would induce knowledge holders to continue the tra-
ditional practices which have helped to maintain high levels of biodi-
versity in their regions over many centuries.218 
2. The Exclusion of Foreign Prior Use as a Prior Art Is Outdated and 
Should Be Eliminated from the Patent Act 
Given that the foreign prior use exclusion comes out of a nine-
teenth century legislation, the United States should reconsider the 
209 SeeCIEL, supra note 6, § I. 
210 See id. 
2ll See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 926-28; Sarma, supra note 11, at 113. 
215 See CIEL, supra note 6, § I. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. 
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continued utility of its application in the modern world.219 Exclusion 
of foreign prior use as a prior art first appeared in U.S. law in the Pat-
ent Act of 1836.220 The 1836 Act required that prior knowledge, use or 
invention by others be "in this country" in order to bar issuance of a 
patent. 221 This exclusion of foreign prior knowledge, use or invention 
as a prior art remains in the Patent Act today.222 Thus, while foreign 
patents and printed publications are considered prior art and pre-
clude subsequent patent of the same invention in the United States, 
the existence of foreign traditional knowledge, which is rarely 
printed, does not preclude issuance of a U.S. patent.223 As illustrated 
by the ayahuasca patent, the exclusion of prior foreign use as a prior 
art makes it difficult for a foreign litigant to defeat a plant patent. 224 
The exclusion of foreign prior knowledge, use or invention as a 
prior art has been under attack for at least thirty years.225 The Presi-
dent's Commission on the Patent System's 1966 Report to the U.S. 
Congress recommended that § 102's geographical distinction be abol-
ished so that foreign knowledge, use and sale would be included as 
prior art.226 As scholars have argued, enacting this recommendation 
219 See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 387, 397; see also Shiva, 
supra note 10. 
220 See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357,5 Stat. 117, 119 (current version at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) (1994)) [hereinafter 1836 Act); Chisum, supra note 19, at 36; Kadidal, supra note 
19, at 385. 
221 1836 Act, ch. 357, supra note 220, §§ 7, 15. Congressional rationale of the exclusion 
did not appear "in the report accompanying the 1836 Act or in the subsequent 
codifications." Chisum, supra note 19, at 36. Chisum speculates that the change may have 
been in response to a contemporaneous Supreme Court decision which "invalidated a 
patent because of use of the invention in England and France with the inventor's consent 
prior to his filing an application in the United States." Id. (citing Shaw v. COopl!l; 32 U.S. (7 
Pet.) 292 (1833)). Chisum further speculates that the evidentiary difficulties in proving 
foreign use were influential to Congress's decision. See id. In addition, in 1836, one major 
goal of the patent system was to disclose foreign inventions to the American public which 
would probably have remained secret absent granting of a U.S. patent. See Kadidal, supra 
note 19, at 386. 
222 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), 102(g). 
223 See id. 
224 See Kadidal, supra note 19, at 387. "Biodiversity often leaves little in the way of a pat-
ent record because it tends to occur in countries where its products, or improvements 
thereon, are unpatentable." Id. 
225 See id. at 395. 
226 See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 395-96 (both citing 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF THE ... 
USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 6 (1966)) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION). Chisum notes that the Commission's report "failed to induce any legislative 
action," despite its strong advocacy of a universal conception of prior art. Chisum, supra 
note 19, at 37. 
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would improve global patent protection in three distinct ways.227 First, 
it would prevent the PTO from granting U.S. patents on inventions 
which would be unpatentable abroad because of long use or sale 
there.228 Second, eliminating § 102's geographical distinction would 
further conform U.S. patent law with current European patent laws, 
thus promoting acceptance of a common definition of prior art.229 
And third, it would lead to the establishment of international sci-
entific data banks, eliminating one of the barriers to the useful ex-
change of search results among national patent offices around the 
world.230 
The final and strongest reason to eliminate § 102's geographical 
distinction is that, due to increased international communications, 
travel and trade, the distinction has become unnecessary.231 Today, 
the ease and frequency of researcher access to foreign indigenous 
knowledge point to the falseness of the foreign prior use distinc-
tions.232 The ayahuasca case illustrates this idea well. As discussed 
above, Loren Miller traveled to Ecuador where indigenous people 
gave him samples of ayahuasca, a vine which they had been using for 
religious and healing purposes for generations.233 Because he ob-
tained this information outside of the United States, his subsequent 
patent application was not required to contain any acknowledgment 
of the traditional knowledge supplied by the indigenous tribespeo-
ple.234 Due to the increased ease of traveling to other countries and 
the frequency with which researchers go to developing nations to find 
specimens of plants used in traditional medicine, information gath-
ered in foreign countries, whether previously published or not, 
should be credited as prior art under the Patent Act. 235 
227 See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 395-96 (both citing 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 226, at 6). 
22B See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 395-96 (both citing 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 226, at 6). 
229 See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 395-96 (both citing 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 226, at 6). 
230 See Chisum, supra note 19, at 37; Kadidal, supra note 19, at 395-96 (both citing 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 226, at 6). 
231 See Kadidal, supra note 19, at 397 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 226, 
at 6). 
232 Seeid. (citing CHISUM, supra note 152, § 3.05(5) n.13). 
233 See Pollack, supra note 15, at C4; Wiser, supra note 1, § 1. 
234 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); Wiser, supra note 1, § 2. 
235 See Kadidal, supra note 19, at 397; Shiva, supra note 10. 
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C. Reconciling the TRIPS Agreement with the Biodiversity Convention 
Finally, working to reconcile TRIPS with the goals of the Biodi-
versity Convention could help to promote a more equal sharing of 
profits from products developed from indigenous sources of knowl-
edge.236 As discussed above, article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement re-
quires Member States to protect property rights in microorganisms, 
non-biological and microbiological processes, and plants by either a 
patent system or a sui generis system.237 In contrast, article 3 of the 
Biodiversity Convention recognizes that "[s]tates have ... the sover-
eign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own envi-
ronmental policies .... "238 Despite the differing requirements of the 
two treaties regarding intellectual property protection, it is possible to 
reconcile the goals of both. 239 
The purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to reduce distortions 
and impediments to international trade by protecting intellectual 
property rights on a globallevel.240 Whereas, the ultimate purpose of 
the Biodiversity Convention is to prevent the depletion of the Earth's 
biodiversity and ensure the equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the use of genetic resources.241 To this end, the Convention 
recognizes that sovereign nations have the autonomy to enact protec-
tive measures to conserve their biodiversity.242 It further provides that 
nations can protect both the indigenous knowledge of their people 
and the biological resources within their borders.243 Finally, in con-
trast to TRIPS, the Biodiversity Convention recognizes that knowledge 
deserving of intellectual property protection can be held by commu-
nities, not just private individuals.244 As India has argued to the WTO, 
236 SeeRoht-Arriaza, supra note 6, at 936-37,948-49,965; Sarma, supra note 11, at 135-
36; see also Shiva, supra note 10. 
237 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27(3) (b). 
236 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, art. 3. 
239 See India Paper; supra note 141, 'I 5; Tejera, supra note 10, at 983; see also Shiva, supra 
note 10. 
240 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, pmbl. 
241 See Biodiversity Convention, supm note 61, arts. 1, 8(j). 
242 See id. art. 3. 
243 Seeid. arts. 8(c), 8(j). 
244 See id. art. 8(j); SHIVA, supra note 59, at 122; Tejera, supra note 10, at 984. Article 
8(j) states that application and promotion of the knowledge should be made "with the 
approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge." Biodiversity Convention, 
supra note 61, art. 8(j). 
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the TRIPS Agreement should be reviewed with an eye to recognizing 
these points of the Biodiversity Convention.245 
First, the WTO should review TRIPS' failure to require that bio-
technology patent applications disclose the geographical source of 
the biological resources and the indigenous knowledge used in the 
inventive process.246 Presently, TRIPS requires only that the inventor 
disclose his invention such that a person skilled in the art could utilize 
it.247 In this way, TRIPS' disclosure requirements are similar to the 
patent laws of developed countries, which were, for the most part, 
written with an eye to mechanical and chemical patents.248 TRIPS 
should be amended to recognize that biotechnological inventions re-
quire additional disclosure requirements.249 By including in article 29 
a requirement that biotechnological patent applicants disclose the 
biological source and the indigenous knowledge utilized in the inven-
tion, the WTO would take a step toward reconciling TRIPS with the 
goals of the Biodiversity Convention.25o Such a disclosure to the public 
would give countries the opportunity to review patent applications 
and file any claims before the patent is granted.251 
Second, the TRIPS Agreement should be amended to recognize 
that biological resources and indigenous knowledge are often insepa-
rable.252 To this end, TRIPS should oblige inventors to share the 
benefits derived from inventions with the communities from whence 
the biological resources and indigenous knowledge came.253 This 
could be accomplished through the use of Material Transfer Agree-
ments where the inventor is using biological resources from a devel-
oping country and a Transfer of Information Agreement where the 
invention is based on indigenous knowledge.254 Thus, recognition of 
both biological resources gathered and indigenous knowledge used 
would allow for compensation of the holders of such resources and 
knowledge. 255 
245 See India Pape/; supra note 141, '1 13-18; Tejera, supra note 10, at 984; see also 
CUTS, supra note 142; Shiva, supra note 10. 
246 See India Paper, supra note 141, 1 13; Downes, supra note 14, at 274-75. 
247 See India Paper, supra note 141, , 13; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 29 (1). 
248 See India Paper, supra note 141,,. 13. 
249 See id. 
250 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, art. 15; India Paper, supra note 141, , 13; 
see also Downes, supra note 14, at 274-75. 
251 See India Paper, supra note 141" 13. 
252 See Tejera, supra note 1 0, at 985; see also Seattle Declaration, supra note 142, § 3 (f). 
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Finally, the wro should amend TRIPS such that it would recog-
nize the intellectual property rights of both individuals and communi-
ties.256 To this end, the wro should evaluate implementing a system 
wherein traditional knowledge and contemporary innovations of in-
digenous communities could be protected under a system of intellec-
tual property rights.257 The ability to patent such knowledge and in-
novation would provide a concrete means by which to achieve the 
benefit-sharing objective of the Biodiversity Convention.258 However, 
under current patent regimes, recognizing an indigenous commu-
nity's right to patent its cultural knowledge would prove difficult as 
most patent systems only award patents to individuals.259 One alterna-
tive to patenting traditional knowledge would be a system of geo-
graphical indications for products derived from traditional knowl-
edge. 260 
TRIPS currently allows protection of geographic indications 
which it defines as "indications which identify a good as originating in 
the territory of a [WfO] Member, or a region or locality in that terri-
tory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the 
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. "261 Geo-
graphical indications differ from patents in that their main purpose is 
not to reward innovation.262 Rather, they reward good will and reputa-
tion cultivated over many years by a group of producers.263 In addi-
tion, geographic indications are particularly well-suited to protecting 
traditional knowledge because they are communally based, as op-
posed to patents which reward individual effort and innovation. 264 
Geographic indicators are based upon collective traditions and deci-
sion-making and they protect and reward traditions while allowing for 
evolution. 265 
256 See Tejera, supra note 10, at 985; Shiva, supra note 10. 
257 See India Paper, supra note 141, '( 16. 
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As TRIPS now reads, it does not extend either patent or geo-
graphic indication protection to the traditional knowledge of indige-
nous groups.266 Amending TRIPS to allow for such protection of 
common intellectual property could preserve the integrity of indige-
nous cultural knowledge, thereby allowing the survival of indigenous 
communities.267 Such an amendment would therefore bring TRIPS 
closer to being reconciled with the goals of the Biodiversity Conven-
tion.268 
CONCLUSION 
Shortly after the PTO issued its decision to overturn Loren 
Miller's patent on ayahuasca, Mr. Miller declined to say whether he 
would appeal the PTO decision.269 He did, however, express that he 
could not comprehend what all of the fuss was about. 270 He stated, "If 
this patent was causing any harm to the indigenous people I would 
have canceled it myself."271 Miller went on to say, "I don't care about 
the patent. It's worthless. It's useless, it's just sitting in a drawer. "272 In 
his failure to comprehend the viewpoint of the indigenous tribes re-
garding ayahuasca, Miller personifies the U.S. perspective toward in-
tellectual property rights in biological resources. 
First, like most U.S. courts, Miller fails to recognize the moral 
harm in creating a property right in a sacred plant.273 Although courts 
have historically construed the Patent Act's utility requirement to en-
join the issuance of patents that offend morality, the PTO and mod-
ern courts have largely failed to bar issuance of such patents.274 How-
ever, a few recent decisions in the biotechnology field have signaled a 
possible end to judicial reticence in this area.275 These indications, 
coupled with international legislation that recognizes morality excep-
tions to patent rights, has opened the door to a revival of the moral 
utility doctrine, which could provide a powerful argument for the 
266 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, arts. 15, 24, 27. 
267 See Shiva, supra note 10. 
268 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 61, art. 1; Shiva, supra note 10. 
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273 SeeAlten, supra note 148, at 846-47. 
274 SeeAlten, supra note 148, at 846-47; Magnani, supra note 148, at 451. 
275 See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Prom a Produkt-Und Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 
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barring of biological patents that are morally offensive to indigenous 
communities in developing countries.276 The United States should 
resolve to consider morality when determining whether a patent aJr 
plication passes the utility requirement. 
Second, Miller's disregard for the value of indigenous use and 
knowledge of ayahuasca reflects the U.S. Patent Act's exclusion of 
prior foreign use as prior art.277 The U.s. patent system rewards exclu-
sive property rights to individuals who create new, non-obvious and 
useful inventions.278 The Patent Act does not recognize foreign, in-
digenous use as prior art, nor does it recognize collective intellectual 
property rights in the form of indigenous communities' traditional 
knowledge of local biological resources.279 Thus, the United States' 
narrow definition of intellectual property rights not only precludes 
indigenous communities from reaping a share of the benefits of their 
traditional knowledge, but it encourages the appropriation of this 
knowledge by rewarding individuals who isolate useful chemical com-
pounds from plants used by indigenous people.28o The United States 
should recognize the collective traditional knowledge and use of in-
digenous communities as prior art.281 Such an amendment to the Pat-
ent Act could improve U.S. relations with developing countries, en-
couraging them to allow researchers more open access to their 
biodiversity.282 
Finally, through the TRIPS Agreement, the United States is en-
suring that its intellectual property regime will become the universal 
norm.283 Over 130 countries have already signed TRIPS, thus promis-
ing to enact patent systems or sui generis systems that meet its re-
quirements regarding the protection of individual property interests 
in plant resources.284 Like U.S. patent law, TRIPS only recognizes in-
dividual patent rights.285 
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As scholar, Vandana Shiva argues, the globalization of Western 
intellectual property rights will inevitably diminish the world's biodi-
versity because Western intellectual property regimes place no value 
on the communal knowledge of indigenous sodeties.286 Shiva points 
out that it is the lifestyle of these indigenous groups that has sustained 
and nurtured their countries' biodiversity.287 TRIPS-compliant patent 
laws will lead to the monopolization of the world's biological re-
sources and knowledge, shutting out the indigenous communities 
who sustain that biodiversity.288 
Only by recognizing indigenous rights in their communal knowl-
edge and biological resources will TRIPS ensure that the world's 
biodiversity is sustained. To this end, the United States should work to . 
reconcile TRIPS with the Biodiversity Convention, which recognizes 
communal property rights.289 The ayahuasca patent controversy well 
illustrates the diverging views of developed and developing countries 
regarding patents on biological products. Although, standing alone, 
Miller's patent may seem harmless, it brought out fierce emotion 
from the indigenous people who felt that their very culture was being 
stolen.290 Such a reaction is not unique to the ayahuasca case, as evi-
denced by the reaction of indigenous communities to their countries' 
compliance with TRIPS.291 The United States needs to change its do-
mestic and international patent policies in order to address the claims 
of indigenous people to their biodiversity and traditional knowledge. 
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